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Integration of Tradable Green Certificate Markets: What can 
be expected? 
 
by 
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Abstract: 
 
Recently, many countries have introduced systems of tradable green certificates 
(TGCs) in order to increase the proportion of their electricity supply obtained from 
renewable sources. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the analytics of a 
TGC system of the Nordic type when integrated within several countries and to 
determine what can be expected from the system when applied in a real world setting. 
Both an analytical and a partial equilibrium version of the model are applied. In 
particular, we ask whether it is possible to derive analytically clear cut results with 
respect to how the system affects generation of electricity from renewable resources, 
and from carbon
 
emitting resources, in the same way as it is possible for other known 
policy instruments such as an emission permit system or a plain carbon emission tax. A 
key result is that TGCs may be an imprecise instrument for regulating the generation of 
green electricity and that the combination of TGCs with a system of tradable emission 
permits may yield outcomes contrary to the intended purpose.  
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1. Introduction3 
Many countries pursue policies to increase the share of renewable energy in their total 
energy consumption. For example, the EU has an explicit target to increase its share of 
"green" electricity, generated from renewable energy sources, from its current level of 
14% to 22% by 2010 (EU/COM, 2000). Similar targets exist for the USA (e.g., see 
EPA, 2003). Until recently, the generation of green electricity had been stimulated by 
various subsidy schemes, including subsidized investments, tax relief, and direct 
subsidies per unit of green electricity generated. However, with the liberalization of 
electricity markets, interest has shifted towards other subsidy measures. One 
proposition that has become popular is to introduce systems of tradable green 
certificates (TGCs). Such systems tend to have different designs in different countries, 
but a common feature is that they seek to replace direct public subsidies for renewable 
energy with incentive systems that use the market mechanism. More precisely, the 
objective is to create a market where various kinds of green electricity compete on 
equal terms to relieve the government of the burden of direct involvement in the 
electricity sector's investment decisions. 
 
Since 1998, the Netherlands has applied a system of "green labeling", which is a 
voluntary system of green certificates. The UK and Sweden have compulsory systems 
that use the market mechanism more directly for TGC trading. These systems differ 
significantly from the more established feed-in tariff subsidy schemes that exist in 
countries such as Germany (see Butler and Neuhoff, 2004). Many European countries 
participate in the Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS) that, although not a 
support scheme itself, facilitates many support schemes for green energy.4 In addition, 
several countries outside the EU have shown an interest in introducing TGC systems, 
including Australia, USA, China, and India (see Giovinetto, 2003). 
 
In 2002, the UK introduced a TCG system called the UK Renewables Obligation 
Certificate (ROC) Market. Sweden introduced its system in 2003. The Norwegian 
Parliament has not yet decided but plans exist that Norway and Sweden will start 
                                                 
3
 Financial support from SNF's Energy Research Program (financed by Gassco, Statkraft, Statnett and 
Statoil), the Norwegian Research Council (RENERGI), and the Nordic Energy Research Program 
(NEECI) is gratefully acknowledged. 
4
 RECS is not restricted by national boundaries. It provides a mechanism for representing production of a 
MWh of renewable energy by a unique certificate, which can be transferred from owner to owner before 
being used as proof of generation, or exchanged for financial support (http://www.trecin.com). 
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trading TGCs at some future date, thus creating the first integrated TGC market 
involving several countries.5 As well as analyzing the general functioning of a TGC 
market of the Nordic type,6 this paper discusses how a TGC market is expected to 
perform when it expands to include several countries. 
 
As in any other market, the markets for TGCs consist of suppliers and buyers. 
Suppliers are the producers of green electricity who receive an amount of TGCs 
corresponding to the amount of green electricity they generate. The suppliers may sell 
these TGCs on the TGC market. In this way, the producers receive both the wholesale 
price and the TGC price per MWh of green electricity generated. Buyers of TGCs are 
the retailers or consumers, who are obliged by the government to keep a certain amount 
of TGCs in relation to the total amount of electricity they consume (i.e., both green and 
"black" electricity). This requirement is referred to as the "percentage requirement". 
Thus, the demand for TGCs is derived simply as a percentage of the total end use 
demand for electricity. Based on supply and demand, a single TGC price may then be 
established. The percentage requirement is the primary policy instrument7 that the 
government may use in order to attain the targets for green electricity generation and 
for the mix of black and green electricity. Both Sweden and the UK have specific plans 
for escalating their percentage requirements. 
 
Along with the development of the TGC markets in Europe, a more general and 
comprehensive system of emission permits trading (ETS)8 is about to emerge in the 
EU. The simple idea underlying the ETS is that the emission permit price will add to 
                                                 
5
 In 2004, Nord Pool began trading TGCs on the Swedish market. TGC prices are posted on the Nord 
Pool web page at www.nordpool.no. 
6
 One particular characteristic of the Nordic system is that only small new hydro power plants qualify for 
TGCs, whereas existing large hydro power plants do not. Hence, even though electricity generation in a 
country like Norway is based on almost 100% waterpower, only electricity generated by biomass, wind, 
and new small hydro power plants' biomass will count as green electricity in the TGC system. For this 
reason, it is likely that the percentage requirement will be set at a rather low level (i.e., 2–5%). 
7
 As the UK system the Nordic TGC system sanctions retailers/ consumers for not complying with the 
system. Hence, in the Swedish system the retailers have to pay a penalty for not having sufficient TGCs. 
The penalty is set equal to 150% of the annual average price for the period in question.  One basic 
difference between the UK system and the Nordic system is that the former allows recycling of revenues 
from the buy-out payments required of electricity companies that do not obtain sufficient ROCs. These 
buy-out payments are recycled to suppliers that have presented ROCs. By contrast, the Norwegian 
system does not involve any recycling of the corresponding penalty payments. 
8
 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is based on the EU Directive of Emissions Trading, which 
was adopted in July 2003 (European Commission, 2003) and was put into effect in 2005. At first, it will 
comprise only carbon
 
emissions, but other greenhouse gases will be included later. The system covers 
emissions from several sectors, including electricity and district heating. 
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the cost of using a carbon emitting resource, the cost increment being in proportion to 
the emissions per unit of the resource used. As a result, input substitution in the long 
run is expected to take place in electricity generation, away from coal and gas power 
towards hydro, wind, and nuclear power.9 Hence, even though this system is not 
directly targeted at increasing the share of renewables in electricity provision, clearly 
the system will have an influence on the relative cost of providing green electricity. In 
order to take account of this influence we investigate how the TGC market and the 
electricity market are affected by a carbon emission permit price or alternatively a 
carbon
 
tax. 10 
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the analytics of a TGC system of the 
Nordic type when integrated within several countries and try to determine what can be 
expected from the system when applied in a real world setting. In particular, we ask 
whether it is possible to derive analytically clear cut results with respect to how the 
system affects generation of electricity from renewable resources, and from carbon
 
emitting resources, in the same way as it is possible for other known policy instruments 
such as an emission permit system or a plain carbon emission tax.  
 
To some extent similar problems have been investigated earlier. Amundsen and 
Mortensen (2001) investigated aspects of the percentage requirement for domestic TGC 
and electricity markets. TGC price volatility and banking were dealt with by Amundsen 
et al. (2006). Also, numerical models of TGC and electricity markets have been 
formulated and analyzed (e.g., Bergman and Radetzki, 2003; Bye 2003; Nese, 2003). 
Furthermore, the relationship between TGCs and carbon emission permits have been 
addressed earlier; e.g., in Finon and Menanteau (2003), Jensen and Skytte (2003), and 
Unger and Ahlgren (2003). However, unlike these papers, our focus is on the 
integration of domestic TGC markets into a joint TGC market and on the analytics of 
the effects of the major policy measure, the percentage requirement, and of a carbon 
emission permit price/ carbon
 
tax.  
 
                                                 
9
 Short run input substitution will be limited by available technological possibilities. Therefore, the 
immediate short run effect will probably be substitution from e.g. coal towards natural gas.  
10
 Both the Nordic TGC market and the Nordic electricity market are too small to significantly impact the 
ETS system that covers all of Europe. Hence, we limit our analysis to consider the effects of an 
exogenous shift of the emission 
 
permit price/emission tax.  
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In the following we formulate both an analytic model to derive general results and a 
numerical model to assess the functioning of the combined TGC and electricity markets 
for Norway and Sweden in particular. The paper proceeds as follows. First, we consider 
the joint functioning of a TGC market and an electricity market under autarky, focusing 
on questions such as how the generation of green electricity is affected by the 
percentage requirement, or by an emission permit price or an emission tax. Then, we 
analyze the case where two countries trade in electricity, but not in TGCs. This 
situation may be considered an interim case before a complete set of markets is in 
place. We then proceed to analyze cases involving both a common TGC market and a 
common electricity market. Thereafter, results from the numerical model are presented. 
Finally, we discuss the analytical and numerical results obtained and conclude the 
paper. 
 
2. The model under autarky 
In order to analyze the interplay between the electricity market and the TGC market 
under autarky, we apply the following symbols and functional relationships. 
 
=p End-user price of electricity 
=s Price of TGCs 
=q Wholesale price of electricity 
=x Total consumption of electricity 
=y Production of "black" electricity 
=z Production of "green" electricity 
=α  Green electricity required as a proportion of total electricity consumption 
("percentage requirement") 
τ = Parameter representing a carbon emission permit price or a carbon
 
tax 
=
dg Demand for TGCs 
=
sg Supply of TGCs 
)(xp : Inverse demand function of electricity, where 0')/)(( <=∂∂ pxxp  
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( ; )c c y τ= : Industry cost function11 for black electricity with emission constraints. We 
assume 0>
∂
∂
y
c
, 02
2
≥
∂
∂
y
c
, and
2
0c
y τ
∂
>
∂ ∂
.
12
 
:)(zhh = Industry cost function for green electricity, where 0>
∂
∂
z
h
 and 02
2
>
∂
∂
z
h
 
(.)Π=Π : Profit function 
 
2.1. First-order conditions and the equilibrium 
In this model, the electricity producers supply a common wholesale market within 
which a single wholesale electricity price is established. Retailers purchase electricity 
on the wholesale market and TGCs on the TGC market. The electricity is distributed to 
end users and a single end-user price is established. It is assumed that perfect 
competition prevails in all markets, with many producers of both black and green 
electricity, many retailers, and many end users. Hence, all agents treat the various 
prices as given by the market.  
 
The producers maximize: 
 
[ ]( ) ( ; ) ( )y qy q s z c y h zτΠ = + + − − . 
 
The first-order conditions for black, respectively, green electricity generation are: 
 
( , )c yq
y
τ∂
=
∂
,  
z
zh
sq
∂
∂
=+
)(
. 
 
For each unit of electricity (i.e. MWh) purchased in the wholesale market and sold on 
to end users, retailers have to pay the wholesale price plus a share α  of the TGC price. 
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 The industry cost function is derived by "horizontal addition" of the individual cost functions; i.e., the 
cost of aggregate market supply is minimized. Using the industry cost function avoids using messy 
notation to describe individual decisions and our prime interest is in the equilibrium market solution, not 
individual decisions. However, little detail is lost by this approach as individual first-order conditions for 
electricity producers correspond directly to those derived in the analysis; e.g., conditions 3) and 4) in the 
main text. 
12
 The cost function for black electricity conditional on an emission permit price or an emission
 
tax may 
be derived from a standard cost minimization problem, with the additional constraint that a permit price 
or a tax will have to be paid per unit carbon
 
emitted.    
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For simplicity, electricity distribution is assumed costless.13 With a large number of 
retailers, the competitive equilibrium established by the market must be characterized 
by: p q sα= + . Otherwise, we assume that the amount of TGCs is measured in the 
same unit as the amount of green electricity. Thus, the demand for TGCs is given by 
xg d α=  and the supply by zg s = . 
 
Denoting equilibrium prices and quantities by starred symbols, the equilibrium of the 
two markets is characterized by: 
 
1) *** )( sqxp α+= ; 
2) 
α
*
*** zzyx =+= ; 
3) * ( *, )c yq
y
τ∂
=
∂
; 
4) 
z
zh
sq
∂
∂
=+
*)(**
. 
 
Inserting 2), 3), and 4) into 1), we find that the end-user price in equilibrium may be 
written as a linear combination of the marginal costs of black and green electricity: 
 
 
5) * ( *, ) ( *)( ) (1 ) c y h zp x
y z
τ
α α
∂ ∂
= − +
∂ ∂
. 
 
 
From 2), we see that ** xz α= and ** )1( xy α−= . 
 
2.2. The effects of the percentage requirement 
In the TGC systems, the percentage requirement is perceived as a policy instrument to 
determine the amount of green electricity in end-use consumption. However, because 
the requirement is set as a percentage and not as a specific quantity, it is not necessarily 
true that an increase of the percentage requirement leads to an increase of green 
electricity generation. The share of green electricity generation in total electricity 
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 This assumption does not affect our qualitative results. In the numerical model to follow we do, 
however, include distribution costs.   
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consumption may well increase even if green electricity generation declines, if there is 
a sufficient reduction of electricity consumption and of black electricity generation.14 In 
the following section, we study these effects in more detail.  
To examine the effect of an increase in the percentage requirement15 (i.e., )
*
αd
dz
 on the 
generation of green electricity, we substitute 
α
*
* zx =  and 
α
α ** )1( zy −=  into (5) and 
take the implicit derivates. Hence, omitting the starred symbols for the sake of 
simplicity, we obtain: 
 
 
D
y
c
x
p
xs
d
dz 


∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
+
=
2
2
)1( αα
α
,where 


∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
= 2
2
2
2
2
2)1(
z
h
y
c
x
pD αα . 
 
 
An inspection of the signs shows that the denominator is negative, whereas the 
numerator is indeterminate. Hence, the effect on green electricity generation is 
indeterminate. 
 
With respect to the effect on black electricity generation we obtain: 
 
0
)1( 2
2
<



∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+−
=
D
x
p
z
h
xs
d
dy
αα
α
. 
 
 
Inspection of signs shows that the numerator is positive, whereas the denominator is 
negative. The generation of black electricity is reduced as the percentage requirement 
increases. 
 
With respect to the total electricity consumption, we find: 
 
 
                                                 
14
 In the Swedish system, however, there is no doubt that the intention of the TGC market is to stimulate 
an increase of capacity for generating green electricity. For this reason, our focus throughout the paper 
will be on how the absolute generation of green electricity is affected. 
15
 The results in this paragraph represent a generalization of results in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001). 
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D
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dx 


∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
+
=
2
2
2
2
)1( αα
α
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Inspection of signs shows that this expression is generally indeterminate. However, if 
the marginal cost of black electricity is constant (i.e., 02
2
=
∂
∂
y
c ), we easily see that 
0<
αd
dx
. Thus, an increase of the percentage requirement will lead to a reduction of 
total electricity consumption. However, the impact on green electricity generation 
remains indeterminate. In addition, the effects depend on the level of the percentage 
requirement, α .16 For example, if 0=α , then 0>
αd
dz
, whereas 
αd
dx is indeterminate. 
 
Hence, in conclusion, the introduction of a TGC system of the Nordic type does not 
necessarily lead to greater green electricity generation, but it does lead to a reduction of 
black electricity generation. Furthermore, the effect on total electricity generation is 
indeterminate.  
 
2.3. The effects of the emission permit price/emission tax 
In order to investigate the equilibrium effects of increased emission permit 
price/emission tax on green electricity, we take the implicit derivate of 5) with respect 
toτ  and obtain: 
 
2
(1 )
0
c
dz y
d D
α α
τ
τ
∂
−
∂ ∂
= < . 
 
With the assumed cross effects of the marginal cost function of black electricity it 
follows that the numerator is positive so that the total effect is negative. Hence, 
increased emission permit price/emission tax will not lead to an increase in the 
generation of green electricity. On the contrary, generation of green electricity will 
                                                 
16
 By simplifying the functional forms of the model, for example by assuming linear or constant elastic 
demand and linear marginal cost functions, it is possible to study in more detail how the electricity 
consumption changes as the percentage requirement increases from 0 to 100%; see Bye (2003). 
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decline.17 As *** )1( yxz ααα −== , both the generation of black electricity and the 
total consumption will also decline.  
 
It may seem paradoxical that an increased emission price can actually lead to a 
reduction in the generation of green electricity, as this normally is supposed to 
advantage the producers of green electricity. However, due to the interplay of the 
emission constraints with the TGC market, this will not be the case despite the fact that, 
viewed in isolation, both systems work towards the same end of reducing carbon 
emissions. The reason for this lies in the specific construction of the TGC system. An 
increase of an emission permit price/ emission tax implies an upward shift of the 
marginal cost function for black electricity.18  Recalling that the marginal cost function 
for electricity generated in the required proportion of green and black electricity is a 
linear combination of the marginal cost functions for green and black electricity, 
respectively, it follows immediately that the marginal cost function for electricity in the 
required proportion also must shift upwards. Consequently, in equilibrium, the end user 
price must be higher, consumption must be lower, and so must the generation of both 
green and black electricity in order to preserve the proportion given by the percentage 
requirement.  
3. Trade in electricity only 
In this section, we investigate how a TGC system functions in an open economy by 
expanding the model to include simultaneously functioning markets for electricity and 
TGCs in two countries, country A and country B. The variables involved are the same 
as those under autarky, but there is one set of variables for each country, denoted by 
subscript, i = A, B. In addition, we introduce the "trade variables", m and n, 
representing imports of electricity and TGCs, respectively. Demand may differ between 
                                                 
17
 In general, any positive shift of the marginal cost function for black electricity (e.g. resulting from an 
increase of input prices of black electricity generation) will induce a reduction in the generation of green 
electricity. 
18
 Observe that, as the change of the emission permit price/ emission tax is exogenous in this model, 
there are no effects from the electricity market back to the permit market. Basically, what is happening is 
that the wholesale price will increase following from the increase of the emission permit price/ emission 
tax. However, due to substitution/altered mix within technologies considered black in the system, the 
wholesale price will not increase by as much as the permit price/ tax. In part, the increase of the 
wholesale price will stimulate generation of green electricity. However, the reduction of the TGC price 
more then offset the increase of the wholesale price, wherefore green electricity generation is reduced. 
Observe also that the substitution within the category of black technologies leaves black electricity “less 
black”, but this is not considered green in the terminology of the system.  
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the two countries, but the demand functions have the same mathematical characteristics 
as the demand function in the previous section. Furthermore, we assume that the 
technologies applied in generating black and green electricity may differ between the 
two countries. This implies that comparative advantages and disadvantages may exist 
in the generation of black and green electricity of the countries. We assume that the 
cost functions for black and green electricity have the same mathematical 
characteristics as above.   
 
3.1. First-order conditions and the equilibrium 
First, we assume that cross-border trade takes place only for electricity, not for TGCs. 
Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that there are no transaction costs involved and 
that there are no transmission constraints between the countries.19 For these reasons, we 
can consider the electricity markets of countries A and B to be a single market with a 
common wholesale price; i.e., MBA qqq == . As there are only two countries involved, 
one country's imports must equal the other country's exports. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
it must be the case that ** BA mm −= . The equilibrium conditions for each of the markets 
in each of the countries can be expressed as follows: 
 
6) ( ) *** iiMii sqxp α+= ; 
7) 
i
i
iiii
z
mzyx
α
*
****
=++= ; 
8) 
i
ii
iM
z
zh
sq
∂
∂
=+
)( *** ; 
9) 
*
* ( , )i i
M
i
c yq
y
τ∂
=
∂
. 
 
Inserting 8) and 9) into 6), we find as under autarky: 
 
10) ( ) ( ) * ** ( , ) ( )1 , ,i i i ii i i i
i i
c y h zp x i A B
y z
τ
α α
∂ ∂
= − + =
∂ ∂
. 
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 This assumption is relaxed in the numerical model to follow.  
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3.2. The effects of the percentage requirement 
In this section, we assume that the percentage requirement may be different between 
the two countries and focus on the effects of an increase in the percentage requirement 
in one of the countries, e.g. country A. 
 
Taking the implicit derivate of 10) with respect to αA, we find that the only signs that 
can be determined with certainty are those belonging to the effects on total combined 
black electricity generation for countries A and B, and the effects on country B's green 
electricity generation and electricity consumption. These effects follow from the 
expression below: 
 
( )
ABBA
B
A
A
A
A
AAAA
A EDED
E
x
p
z
h
xs
d
dY
+
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∂
∂
−
∂
∂
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=
2
2
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α
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where BA yyY += , ( ) 01 2
2
2
2
2
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∂
∂
−
∂
∂
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∂
∂
=
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
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2
2
2
2
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i
i
i
i
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i
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∂
∂


∂
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−
∂
∂
= α , for BAi ,=  
 
Inspection of signs shows that the numerator is positive and the denominator negative. 
Hence, the effect on the aggregate generation of black electricity in the two countries is 
negative. 
 
Furthermore, it can be shown that:20 
A
B
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
d
dz
sign
d
dx
sign
d
dm
sign
d
dy
sign
d
dy
sign
ααααα
−=−=== . 
As 0<
∂
∂
A
Y
α
, it follows that 0<
∂
∂
A
Ay
α
 and 0<
∂
∂
A
By
α
. Furthermore, it must be the case 
that 0>
A
B
d
dx
α
 and 0>
A
B
d
dz
α
. In other words, somewhat surprisingly, the increase of the 
percentage requirement in country A leads to an increase in both electricity 
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 Proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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consumption and green electricity generation in country B while these effects are 
indeterminate for country A.21 
 
In order to explain these effects, we first recall that an increase in the percentage 
requirement will necessarily lead to a reduction in the wholesale price of electricity. 
For country A, the effects on electricity generation and consumption are the same as 
those under autarky. However, in this two-country model with a common electricity 
market, the reduction of the wholesale price will imply that electricity becomes cheaper 
in country B, thus leading to increased demand in this country. However, in order to 
satisfy the percentage requirement, the demand for TGCs will have to increase in 
country B. As there is no trade in TGCs, the increase in demand for TGCs can only be 
satisfied by a corresponding increase of the TGC supply in country B. Hence, the 
generation of green electricity will have to increase in country B. Therefore, we arrive 
at the somewhat counterintuitive result that an increase of the percentage requirement 
in country A may lead to a reduction of green electricity generation in country A, but 
will definitely lead to an increase of green electricity in country B. 
 
3.3. The effects of the emission permit price/emission tax 
In this case an increase of the carbon emission permit price/ carbon tax implies a 
reduction of green electricity generation in both countries, i.e. 0Adz
dτ
< and 0Bdz
dτ
< , a 
reduction of total generation of black electricity, i.e. 0Y
τ
∂
<
∂
, and a corresponding 
increase of the wholesale price, i.e. 0Mq
τ
∂
<
∂
 . (Proof is given in Appendix A). The 
intuition behind these results is the same as the intuition for the autarky case. 
4. Trade in both electricity and TGCs 
In this section both electricity and TGCs are traded. This implies that both the 
wholesale price of electricity and the price of TGCs are common for the countries. 
                                                 
21
 From a numerical model satisfying the assumptions of this paper, it can be shown that equilibria exist 
where the green electricity generation and electricity consumption in country A may either increase or 
decrease following an increase in the percentage requirement in country A. The details of this proof are 
not included in the paper, but may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Hence, As  and Bs  are replaced by Ms  in the objective functions and first-order 
conditions below. Otherwise, the model specification is as in the previous case. 
 
4.1. First-order conditions and equilibrium 
TGCs will be imported if the domestic demand for certificates exceeds the domestic 
supply. In equilibrium, the imports of one country will be equivalent to the exports of 
the other country; i.e. ** BA nn −= . The trade in TGCs implies that the relative share of 
green electricity generated in one country may be different from the percentage 
requirement. The equilibrium can be expressed as follows: 
 
11) ( ) *** MiMii sqxp α+= ; 
12) 
i
ii
iiii
nz
mzyx
α
**
**** +
=++= ; 
13) 
i
ii
MM
z
zh
sq
∂
∂
=+
)( *** ; 
14) 
*
* ( , )i i
M
i
c yq
y
τ∂
=
∂
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Inserting 13) and 14) into 11), we find again. 
 
15) ( ) ( ) * ** ( , ) ( )1 , ,i i i ii i i i
i i
c y h zp x i A B
y z
τ
α α
∂ ∂
= − + =
∂ ∂
. 
 
4.2. The effects of the percentage requirement 
The analysis shows that it is possible to determine only the effect on black electricity 
generation of an increase in the percentage requirement. Again, this effect is negative 
i.e. 0<
Ad
dY
α
. To realize this, assume the opposite i.e. 0
A
dY
dα
≥ . This implies an 
increase in green electricity generation in order to fulfill the percentage requirement in 
both countries. Hence, in equilibrium, the consumption of green electricity must 
increase in both countries, as we now have a common market for both electricity and 
TGCs. Constant or increased generation of black electricity implies that the wholesale 
price, Mq , is constant or increases, respectively. Furthermore, for the generation of 
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green electricity to increase, the price of green electricity, MM sq + , must increase. From 
11), this implies an increase in the end-user price of electricity in both countries. This is 
not compatible with an increase in the consumption of electricity. Thus, we have a 
contradiction, which leads to the result that 0<
Ad
dY
α
.  Furthermore, as in the case of 
trade in electricity only, it can be shown that
A
B
A
A
d
dy
sign
d
dy
sign
αα
= . Hence, we must 
have 0<
A
A
d
dy
α
 and 0<
A
B
d
dy
α
.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the effect on total green electricity generation of  
increasing the percentage requirement in country A is indeterminate. As we now have a 
common market for TGCs,  it can be shown that: 
A
B
A
A
d
dz
sign
d
dz
sign
αα
= . Thus, in 
contrast to the case of trade in electricity only, an additional opportunity for trading 
TGCs implies that we no longer obtain the unambiguous result that an increase of Aα  
leads to an increase in green electricity generation in country B. The change in green 
electricity generation must now occur in the same direction in both countries.22 Finally, 
the results show that the effect on electricity consumption is indeterminate in both 
countries. 
 
 
4.3. The effects of the emission permit price/ emission tax 
In this case, increased emission permit price/emission tax implies a reduction of green 
electricity generation in both countries i.e. 0Adz
dτ
< and 0Bdz
dτ
< , a reduction of total 
generation of black electricity, i.e. 0Y
τ
∂
<
∂
, and a corresponding increase of the 
wholesale price, i.e. 0Mq
τ
∂
<
∂
 . (Proof is given in Appendix A). The intuition behind 
these results is the same as the intuition for the autarky case. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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5. Numerical analysis and discussion 
The results from the analytical model investigated above are somewhat discouraging. 
Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1 that summarizes the results, not very much can be 
said about the effects of increasing the percentage requirement that is the main policy 
instrument of the TGC system. In fact, with trade in both electricity and TGCs the only 
clear cut result is that the generation of black electricity will be reduced in the 
participating countries, and there is no guarantee that generation of green electricity 
will be stimulated. Also, nothing precise can be said about the effect on total electricity 
generation. However, an increase of the emission permit price/emission
 
tax will 
definitely reduce green electricity generation which may seem somewhat surprising. In 
view of these results it may be of some interest to investigate how the TGC system will 
function when applied to a real world case. For that purpose we apply a partial 
equilibrium model for Norway and Sweden using realistic parameter values.  
 
Table1. Effects of the percentage requirement (α ) and of the emission permit 
price/emission tax (τ )  
 
A
A
d
dz
α
 
A
B
d
dz
α
 
A
A
d
dy
α
 
A
B
d
dy
α
 
A
A
d
dx
α
 
A
B
d
dx
α
 
Adz
dτ
 
Bdz
dτ
 
Autarky                
 
?  -  ?  -  
Trade in electricity  
only 
? + - - ? + - - 
Trade in electricity 
and TGCs 
? ? - - ? ? - - 
 
 
The model is based on the principles of the analytical model developed above and is 
designed to take care of trade in both electricity and TGCs between the two countries in 
2010.23 It determines equilibrium prices and quantities on, and cross border tariffs 
between, the electricity markets as well as equilibrium prices and trade on the markets 
for TGCs in Norway and Sweden.  Basic features of the model are described in 
Appendix B.  
                                                 
23
 The basic model is developed by Lars Bergman, Stockholm School of Economics and applied in e.g. 
Andersson and Bergman (1995) and Amundsen and Bergman (2002). The TGC part was included in the 
model for Sweden by Bergman and Radetzki (2003) and further updated and expanded for the present 
purpose.  Detailed information on data can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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First we consider the effects of introducing a TGC system with a percentage 
requirement of 5% for Norway and 12.7% for Sweden.24 Thereafter we consider the 
effects of changing the carbon
 
emission tax. We follow the general structure of the 
analytical part of the paper and consider three scenarios for each of these two cases: i) 
Autarky, ii) Trade of electricity only and iii) Trade in electricity and TGCs.  
 
5.1 The effects of introducing a TGC system  
The effects of introducing a TGC system for Norway are summarized in Table 2.  
Technically this has been achieved by increasing the percentage requirement from zero 
to 5%.  
 
Table 2. Effects of introducing a TGC market for Norway. Figures in TWh and 
EUR25/MWh  
α  z  y  x  q  s  p  
0 0.8 130.5 131.3 26.38 0 26.38 
0.05 6.7 127.6 134.3 23.22 24.14 24.42 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, we have the expected effects of reduced wholesale price 
of electricity and reduced generation of black electricity. Also, there is an increase of 
green electricity as well as of total electricity generated and a reduction of the end user 
price. Basically what is happening in this case is that revenues (hydro rents) are 
transferred from hydro power producers as subsidies to the producers using new green 
generation capacity. Hence, for this numerical case, the indeterminate effects on green 
electricity generation and total electricity consumption from the analytical model have 
been determined.  
 
Table 3 displays the effects of introducing TGC markets in both countries but allowing 
for trade in electricity only. The Table shows three features. Firstly, it shows that the 
effects of introducing a TGC market in Sweden are similar to those in Norway.  
                                                 
24
 For Sweden this percentage corresponds to the escalation plan for 2010. For Norway a percentage 
requirement of 5% has been proposed but not decided. 
25
 Swedish kronor (SEK) has been converted to Euro by using the 2005 average exchange rate of 9.29 
per EUR.  
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Table 3. Effects of introducing TGC markets for Norway and Sweden with trade in 
electricity only. Figures in TWh and EUR/MWh  
Nα  Sα  Nz  Sz  Ny  Sy  Nx  Sx  Nq  Sq  Ns  Ss  Np  Sp  
0 0 0.8 1.3 129.0 171.0 131.1 171.0 25.86 25.83 0 0 25.86 25.83 
0 0.127 0.8 21.3 127.4 164.5 134.1 168.0 24.57 24.48 0 22.88 24.57 27.38 
0.05 0.127 6.8 21.9 127.4 164.5 136.3 172.3 22.00 21.98 25.36 25.38 23.27 25.20 
0.10 0.127 10.3 22.0 106.1 150.6 103.5 173.2 13.24 8.61 497.42 90.57 62.98 20.12 
 
Secondly, Table 3 shows the effects of introducing a TGC market in Norway in 
addition to that in Sweden. In this case the generation of green electricity as well as 
total electricity consumption increase in both countries. Furthermore, the wholesale 
prices fall in both countries but due to the assumed stepwise linear marginal cost 
functions the generation of black electricity is not affected in any of the countries. 
Thirdly, Table 3 shows what is happening as the percentage requirement increases in 
Norway (from 5 to 10 percent) but remains the same in Sweden. One effect of this 
change is a reduction of black electricity generated in each of the countries and a 
corresponding reduction of wholesale prices (that are not completely equalized due to 
transmission constraints). Also we see that the generation of green electricity increases. 
This is as expected for Sweden according to the analytical model. However, even the 
green electricity generation in Norway increases. This effect was indeterminate in the 
analytical model. Furthermore, it turns out that total electricity consumption falls in 
Norway while it increases in Sweden. Also, Table 3 shows that this change has very 
strong effects on the TGC prices and end user prices in both countries.  
 
Table 4 displays the effects of introducing TGC markets in Norway and Sweden and 
allowing for trade in both electricity and TGCs. We observe that the generation of 
green electricity is increased in both countries. In Norway the increase is larger in the 
case of a common TGC system between Norway and Sweden, than in the case of 
separate TGC systems. In both the cases, the generation of black electricity is reduced. 
This reflects a competitive advantage for generation of green electricity in Norway. 
Thus, TGCs are exported from Norway to Sweden. As expected, Norway and Sweden 
get identical TGC prices in the common TGC system.  
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Table 4. Effects of introducing TGC markets for Norway and Sweden with trade in both 
electricity and TGCs. Figures in TWh and EUR/MWh  
Nα  Sα  Nz  Sz  Ny  Sy  Nx  Sx  Nq  Sq  Ns  Ss  Np  Sp  NSz * 
0 0 0.8 1.3 129.0 171.0 132.1 171.0 25.86 25.83 0 0 25.86 25.83 0 
0 0,127 0.8 20.1 127.4 164.7 133.8 167.6 24.78 24.75 0 22.62 24.78 27.62 0.8 
0,05 0,127 10.3 17.9 127.4 164.5 136.3 172.3 22.00 21.98 25.38 25.38 23.27  25.20 3.6 
0,10 0,127 10.34 22.2 127.4 134.1 125.8 155.6 11.83 1184 185.37 185.37 30.37 35.38 1.0 
*
 This variable reflects the net export of TGCs from Norway to Sweden 
 
The last row of Table 4 illustrates a situation in which Norway increases its percentage 
requirement from 5 to 10 per cent, while Sweden continues on 12.7 per cent. In 
accordance with the theoretical results we note that the positive effect on the generation 
of green electricity is significantly stronger in Sweden than in Norway, even as the 
Swedish percentage requirement is unchanged, while the Norwegian percentage 
requirement is increased. In this case, the consumption of electricity is, however, 
reduced in both countries.  
 
5.2 The effects of the emission permit price/ emission tax 
From Table 5 we see that the effects of increasing the emission permit price/ emission 
tax for Norway under autarky are rather small. The reason is that electricity in Norway 
is mostly generated from hydro which causes no carbon emissions. However, as can be 
seen from Table 5, the wholesale price of electricity increases, thus leading to a little 
less black electricity generated. Otherwise, there is no noticeable effect on green 
electricity generation, but the price of TGCs falls in accordance with the analytical 
results.    
 
Table 5. Effects of changing the emission permit price/ emission tax for Norway under 
autarky. Figures in TWh and EUR/MWh  
τ  z  y  x  q  s  p  
0 6.7 127.6 134.3 23.22 24.14 24.42 
4,2 6.7 127.4 134.1 23.25 24.11 24.46 
8,4 6.7 127.4 134.1 23.26 24.10 24.47 
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Table 6 displays the effects of increasing the emission permit price/ emission tax for 
Norway and Sweden with trade in electricity only. Again, the effects of changing the 
carbon tax are relatively modest as both Norway and Sweden have little emission of 
carbon in electricity generation. Sweden does, however, have some generation coming 
from combined heat and power plants. This appears to be the marginal technology for 
generation of black electricity in the simulations. Thus, this is the reason why the 
generation of black electricity in Sweden is reduced as the emission permit price/ 
emission tax is increased, while Norway is not affected at all. Furthermore, we notice 
that raising the emission permit price/ emission tax leads to a higher wholesale price of 
electricity and a lower TGC-price. Our result from the theoretical analysis thus seems 
to be confirmed by the numerical simulations, i.e. increasing the emission permit price/ 
emission tax in a system which also includes TGCs may have an adverse effect on the 
generation of green electricity; although, the effect is not very strong.  
 
Table 6. Effects of changing the emission permit price/ emission tax for Norway and 
Sweden with trade in electricity only. Figures in TWh and EUR/MWh  
τ  
Nz  Sz  Ny  Sy  Nx  Sx  Nq  Sq  Ns  Ss  Np  Sp  
0 6.8 21.9 127.4 164.5 136.3 172.3 22.00 21.98 25.36 25.38 23.27 25.20 
4,2 6.8 21.8 127.4 163.5 135.8 171.7 22.31 22.28 25.06 25.08 23.55 25.47 
8,4 6.8 21.1 127.4 162.6 135.2 171.1 22.66 22.64 24.70 24.73 23.90 27.85 
 
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the effects of changing the emission permit price/ emission tax 
for Norway and Sweden with trade both in electricity and TGCs. We notice that 
opening of trade in TGCs does not affect the results, other than for the domestic 
generation of green electricity. The effects of changing the emission permit price/ 
emission tax are similar to the case in which only electricity is traded.  
 
Table 7. Effects of changing the emission permit price/ emission tax for Norway and 
Sweden with trade both in electricity and TGCs. Figures in TWh and EUR/MWh  
τ  
Nz  Sz  Ny  Sy  Nx  Sx  Nq  Sq  Ns  Ss  Np  Sp  NSz * 
0 10.3 17.9 127.4 164.5 136.3 172.3 22.00 21.98 25.38 25.38 23.27 25.20 3.6 
4,2 10.3 17.8 127.4 163.5 135.8 171.7 22.30 22.28 25.08 25.08 23.56 25.47 3.6 
8,4 10.3 17.6 127.4 162.6 135.2 171.1 22.65 22.63 24.74 24.74 23.89 25.77 3.7 
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6. Summary and concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the analytics of a TGC system of the 
Nordic type when integrated within several countries and try to determine what can be 
expected from the system when applied in a real world setting. In particular, we ask 
whether it is possible to derive analytically clear-cut results with respect to how the 
system affects generation of electricity from renewable resources, and from carbon
 
emitting resources, in the same way as it is possible for other known policy instruments 
such as an emission permit system or a plain carbon emission tax. In particular, the 
paper addresses the role of policy measures in TGC markets, the integration of country-
specific TGC markets, and compatibility issues between TGC markets and an emission 
permit system/ emission tax system. Both an analytical model and a partial equilibrium 
model for Norway and Sweden are applied.   
 
One of the main conclusions of this paper is that the percentage requirement is not a 
very precise policy measure for stimulating green electricity generation.  Thus, an 
increase of the percentage requirement will not necessarily lead to an increase of green 
electricity generation in the long run, though it will lead to less generation of black 
electricity. It guarantees only an increase in green electricity's share of total 
consumption. These results are shown to be valid for all the cases investigated; i.e., 
under autarky and when electricity, or both electricity and TGCs, are traded between 
two countries. However, it should be noted that a larger percentage requirement may be 
compatible with more green electricity generation over time if there is a general 
increase of demand. Still, the immediate effect of a higher percentage requirement on 
green electricity generation cannot be guaranteed.26 Hence, if the objective is to achieve 
a given target of new green generation capacity, a TGC system may not be the best 
system to use. Other systems, such as a tendering or auction system, or a system of 
plain subsidies, may work better in this respect. On the other hand, the TGC system 
does provide a strong role for market forces and do take account of consumers' 
willingness to pay for electricity via the effects on demand and the end-user price. In 
                                                 
26
 Moreover, the percentage requirement for a single country is not a very potent measure if the country 
in question is part of a large internationally integrated system of competitive markets for electricity and 
TGCs. Such a circumstance would imply that the prices of electricity and TGCs are given, and that the 
electricity producers and the retailing companies in the economy will adapt to these prices. However, this 
in turn implies that neither the percentage requirement nor the TGC price bounds for a given country can 
be used to influence the green electricity generation or the composition of green and black electricity in 
that country. 
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addition, the TGC system allows for voluntary purchases of TGCs by consumers who 
wish to support green electricity generation.27 
 
Furthermore, as both the theoretical and numerical analysis show, an increase of the 
percentage requirement will have an indeterminate effect on total electricity 
consumption under autarky. Also, in the case where one country implements a TGC 
system and trades electricity with another country, the effect of an increase of the 
percentage requirement on total consumption will be indeterminate in the country 
implementing the TGC system. However, as confirmed in the numerical analysis, the 
other country will experience an increase in both the total electricity consumption and 
green electricity generation. Still, allowing for trade of TGCs between the countries 
leads to an indeterminate effect on both these variables in the country that does not 
implement the TGC system.  
 
Another main conclusion of the paper is that an increase of an emission permit price/ 
emission tax will push the price of TGCs downwards, lowering the profits of the green 
electricity producers and thus lead to a reduction of green electricity generation. This 
result was shown to be valid in all specified cases as well as in the partial equilibrium 
model. This also raises the question as to why two policy measures are needed to 
achieve what seems to be a common goal (i.e. emission reduction), as in the case of the 
European ETS and TGC systems. Presumably, the answer is that the aims of the two 
systems are somewhat different. The ETS system is targeted at reducing global 
emissions of carbon and says nothing about that this must be achieved through 
increased generation of green electricity. The TGC system, on the other hand, is 
targeted directly at achieving an electricity supply from renewable sources. Clearly, the 
TGC system may achieve a reduction of carbon emissions, but it also reduces the use of 
nonrenewable sources, notably crude oil and natural gas, that are in scarce supply and 
used at the expense of future generations. 
 
Additional problems associated with the TGC systems need to be resolved. One 
problem relates to TGC price volatility. If the green generation technologies in a 
country largely consist of wind or water power, sizable and erratic variations of green 
                                                 
27
 The option of buying green electricity at a surcharge has been offered in many countries, for instance 
Vattenfall in Sweden. However, demand has been low. 
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electricity generation may occur, owing to natural annual variations of wind or 
precipitation. Therefore, there may be similar variations in the numbers of TGCs for 
sale. This in turn will give rise to a high volatility of TGCs prices. Hence, potential 
investors in green electricity capacity face a highly uncertain rate of return on their 
investments and therefore require high expected rates of return to be willing to invest. 
To some extent, however, the problem of price volatility may be resolved by the 
introduction of permit banking (see Amundsen et al., 2006).  
 
Another problem related to the TGC market is the potentially high market power that a 
producer of green electricity may possess. The reason for this is that the percentage 
requirement implies that one TGC counts for a multiple of MWh in consumption. 
Hence, by withholding TGCs, a green producer may significantly reduce consumption 
and increase the end-user price, even though the producer's own power generation is 
not that large.  
 
Along with the other potential problems discussed above, the problems revealed in this 
paper clearly call for caution in the design and implementation of TGC systems, not 
least when they are put into place on top of emission trading systems. 
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 Appendix A 
i) Proof of the effects of the emission permit price/emission tax as there is trade in electricity 
only  
 
To verify that 0Adz
dτ
< and 0Bdz
dτ
< , rearrange 10) to obtain: 
 
( ) ( )
i
ii
iMiii
z
zh
qxp
∂
∂
+−=
)(1
*
* αα . 
 
which upon differentiation gives: 
 
A1) 
2
2 (1 ) , ,i i i i Mi i
i i
p dx h dz dq i A B
x d z d d
α α
τ τ τ
∂ ∂
− = − =
∂ ∂
.  
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From 7), we have iii xz α= . Therefore, we may write: 
 
A2) 
2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
A A A M B B B
A B
A A A A B B B B
p h dz dq p h dz
x z d d x z d
α α
α α τ τ α α τ
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− = = −   
− ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂   
. 
To prove the above claim by contradiction, assume 0Adz
dτ
≥ . Inspecting the signs of A2), we 
see that this implies 0Bdz
dτ
≥ , 0Adx
dτ
≥ , 0Bdx
dτ
≥ , and 0Mdq
dτ
≤ . From 9), we see 
that 0Mdq
dτ
≤  implies 0Ady
dτ
<  and 0Bdy
dτ
< . Upon applying 7) and eliminating im , we find: 
 
A3) ( ) ( )1 1A B A BA Bdx dx dy dyd d d dα ατ τ τ τ− + − = + . 
 
Inspection of the signs of A3) reveals that the left-hand side is nonnegative, whereas the right-
hand side is negative. Hence, there is a contradiction. Therefore, it follows that the generation 
of green electricity and the consumption of electricity must fall in both countries. Furthermore, 
from A3), it is apparent that the total generation of black electricity must be reduced, whereas 
A2) makes it clear that the wholesale price of electricity will have to go up.  
 
ii) Proof of the effects of the emission permit price/emission tax as there is trade in both 
electricity and TGCs  
To verify that 0Adz
dτ
< and 0Bdz
dτ
< first observe from 12) that: 
 
A4) A B A BA B
dx dx dz dz
d d d d
α α
τ τ τ τ
+ = +  and 
 
A5) (1 ) (1 )A B A BA B
dx dx dy dy
d d d d
α α
τ τ τ τ
− + − = + . 
 
To prove the above claim by contradiction, assume that the generation of green electricity in 
country A is not reduced; i.e. 0Adz
dτ
≥ . From 13), it follows that if one country does not reduce 
green electricity generation, this implies that the other country will not reduce its green 
electricity generation either. This must be the case as both countries are subject to the same 
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change in MM sq + . From A4), we observe that this means that the consumption of electricity 
in at least one of the countries must either increase or remain constant. Assume that country A 
does not reduce its consumption of electricity; i.e., 0Adx
dτ
≥  Differentiating 15) in the same 
way that we found A2), we find: 
 
A6) 
2 2
2 2
1 1
1 1
A A A A M B B B B
A B
A A A B B B
p dx h dz dq p dx h dz
x d z d d x d z d
α α
α τ τ β α τ τ
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− = = −   
− ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂   
. 
 
As 0Adz
dτ
≥  and 0Adx
dτ
≥ , we observe from A6) that 0Mdq
dτ
≤ , which implies 0Ady
dτ
<  and 
0Bdy
dτ
< . Therefore, the right-hand side of A5) is negative, whereas the right-hand side of A4) 
is nonnegative. For this to happen, we must have 0Bdx
dτ
<  and in addition BA αα > . As we 
have assumed that green electricity generation does not decline and we have 0Mdq
dτ
≤ , it 
follows that 0Mds
dτ
≥ . From A2), we see that for green electricity generation to decrease in 
country A, we must have BA αα < . This contradicts that BA αα > . Hence, the conclusion is 
that green electricity generation will be reduced in both countries.  
 
Appendix B: Some basic features of the partial equilibrium model 
The model applied depicts the behavior of individual power producing firms on the Norwegian 
– Swedish electricity market. In addition there is an independent grid operator that owns and 
operates an inter-connector between the two countries. The flow of power across the national 
border is constrained by transmission capacity. Each firm, df  has a country location, d  and 
operates a set of generating units, all located in the home country. Firms may be of different 
sizes, and may have different “portfolios” of generating units. These are divided into three 
categories, ,i j and g . Category i  consists of existing hydro-, existing nuclear- and existing 
wind power plants. Category j consists of condensing and combined heat (CHP) power plants 
and category g  consists of new hydro-, new wind, and bio power plants. Categories ,i j are 
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considered “black”, whereas g is considered “green”28. Quantities produced in 
categories i , j , g  and   total quantity produced in firm df  are denoted df iY  df jY df gZ and  dfX , 
respectively. Hence, 
3 2 3
1 1 1
d d d df f i f j f gX Y Y Z= + +∑ ∑ ∑ .  
 
Cost functions 
For each given level of output the individual firm allocates production between the different 
generating units in order to minimize cost. The solution of this cost minimization problem 
defines the cost function of the individual firm. Hydro-, nuclear-, wind- and bio power plants 
are assumed to be homogenous, i.e., for each type of plant the marginal cost is independent of 
the level of capacity utilization and equal to ic , (for existing hydro-, existing nuclear- and 
existing wind power), and gh , (for new hydro-, new wind- and bio power). The total available 
capacity in plants of type i , j and g in firm df are denoted df iK , df jK and df gK , respectively.  
 
Condensing and CHP generating units are assumed to be heterogeneous (due to differing fuel 
input and thermal efficiency). Heterogeneity is reflected in the marginal cost function of 
condensing and CHP plants, respectively. These functions are written  
d
d
d
f j
f j j j
f j
Y
C a b
K
ρ 
= +    
 
 
Here, ja represents the marginal cost of the least expensive unit of type j , while 
j ja b+ represents the marginal cost of operating the most expensive generating unit of type 
j close to full capacity. Furthermore, ρ is a (positive) technological parameter. All 
parameters are estimated on the basis of engineering data, whereas capacity data are obtained 
from published reports.     
 
The solution to the cost minimization problem is captured in the marginal cost function 
denoted ( , , , )
d d d d d df f f f i f j f gC C X K K K= . The function includes a tax on carbon emission and 
takes into account that the net cost of generating a unit of green electricity is equal to g dh s−  , 
where ds is the TGC price.  
                                                 
28
 This is according to governmental decisions. Hence, for  Norway “black” electricity generation is 
almost exclusively taking place in water power plants whereas  black electricity generation in Sweden 
also includes electricity from nuclear-, gas- and  coal power plants.  
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Demand function 
The demand for electricity by consumers in country r ,
r
E , depends only on the area price, 
r
P . 
The price elasticity of demand in country r  is denoted 
r
η and is assumed to be constant. Thus, 
the inverse demand function for consumers in country r becomes 
 
1
0
0( ) rrr r
r
EP P
E
η
=  
Where 0
r
P is the base year price and 0
r
E the base year consumption in country r . 
 
Equilibrium on the electricity market 
The spatial allocation of generation and consumption, in conjunction with inter-connector 
capacity limitations29, makes it important to distinguish between the amount of electricity 
generated and the amount of electricity supplied in different regions by a given firm. Letting Q  
denote supply we thus have
d drf f
r
X Q=∑ . The total supply of power in country r , rQ  is 
defined by
d
d
r f r
d f
Q Q=∑∑ . In equilibrium it holds that r rQ E= . When the inter-connector 
capacity is not congested (or in autarky) there is a single equilibrium price, otherwise not.  
 
Equilibrium on the TGC market  
The demand for TGCs in country r is equal to 
r r
Eα  where 
r
α is the percentage requirement. 
The generation of TGCs by firm df  is equal to df gZ . Denoting supply of TGCs by drfN we 
have
d drf g f
r
Z N=∑ . The total supply of TGCs in country r , rN  is defined 
by
d
d
r f r
d f
N N=∑∑ . In equilibrium it holds that r r rN Eα= . With a common TGC market, a 
single TGC price,
r
s is established, otherwise separate TGC prices are established. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 To save space the transmission part of the model is not discussed. 
